Harrington Properties, Inc, Robert L. Harrinton and Jane R. Harrington v. Marilyn Hamilton Petersen : Brief of Appellees by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Harrington Properties, Inc, Robert L. Harrinton
and Jane R. Harrington v. Marilyn Hamilton
Petersen : Brief of Appellees
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Harold C. Verhaaren; John K. Mangum; Scott M. Ellsworth; Nielsen & Senior; P.C; Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellants.
James S. Jardine; Brent D. Wride; Eric D. Barton; Ray; Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Harrington Properties v. Petersen, No. 970717 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1313
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HARRINGTON PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; ROBERT L. 
HARRINGTON and JANE R. 
HARRINGTON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON; and 
GLOBAL MOTOR INNS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OBIIMPPELLEES 
Case NoJ»70717-CA 
Priori tf|po. 15 
Appeal from Declaratory Judgment EnfMted by 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt like County, 
the Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Harold C. Verhaaren 
John K. Mangum 
Scott NL Ellsworth 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, # 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellants 
James S. 
Brent D. 
Eric D. 
RAY, QUI! 
79 Sout^ j 
P.O. Box] 
Salt Lakl 
irdine 
ride 
:ton 
2Y & NEBEKER 
Lin Street 
5385 
;ity, UT 84145-0385 
AttorneyMltor Plaintiffs/ 
Appelleelil 
DOCKET NO 
FILED 
iitah Court of Aopeais 
MAR 2 7 1998 
Julia D'AJesandro 
Cterk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HARRINGTON PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; ROBERT L. 
HARRINGTON and JANE R. 
HARRINGTON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
Harold C. Verhaaren 
John K. Mangum 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, # 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 970717-CA 
Priority No. 15 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
Eric D. Barton 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON; and 
GLOBAL MOTOR INNS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appeal from Declaratory Judgment Entered by 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellants Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES , 
JURISDICTION 
ISSUES . . . . . . . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULho, M\L-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Diatiu • 
Court , , . 
Statement ui races 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . 
ARGuM—- ' . 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
FEBRUARY 1993 ADDITIONAL ADVANCES WERE NOT SECURED 
BY THE SUNSET OAKS TRUST DEED II 
A. ;nt jjisLiict Court Properly Held that the 
Additional Advances are Governed by Clause 
• ~'• :f 'he Trust Deed 
xiie plain language of clause =v3) 
demonstrates that it applies to ::he 
February 1993 advance0 
Clause (3) of the trust deed is not 
limited to "unrelated" loans or 
advances , 
•.ldubtib \±) , (2) , and (4) of the trust 
deed do not apply to the February 199 3 
advances 
The district court properly rejected 
Peterson's argument that she intended 
the advances to be secured by the trust 
deed 
B. The District Court Correctly Ruled that the 
February 18 Letter Agreement Does Not Meet 
the Requirements of Clause (3) 20 
1. The only document setting forth the 
parties' agreement regarding the 
February 1993 advances is the February 
18 Letter Agreement. . . 21 
2. The February 18 Letter Agreement is not 
a promissory note, .. ' 21 
3. The February 18 Letter Agreement does 
not recite that it is secured by the 
Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II 22 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NO INTEREST 
RAN ON THE PETERSON NOTE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 24, 
1994 26 
A. Under Utah Law, the Construction of 
Unambiguous Contracts is a Matter of Law . . . 27 
B. The Peterson Note Unambiguously Provides That 
Interest is not Applicable 27 
C. The December 8 Agreement Unambiguously 
Modifies the Due Date of the Peterson Note 
Without Modifying the Interest Term 29 
III. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES 34 
CONCLUSION 35 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3 6 
ADDENDUM 
A. Peterson Note, dated June 21, 1991 
B. Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, dated June 21, 1991 
C. December 8 Agreement 
D. February 18 Letter Agreement 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bank of Ephraim v. Davis. 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977) . ". '.". 14 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs,. 752 P.2d 892 
(Utah 1988) . . . . 21 
Dobrusky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1987) 28 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration. 909 P.2d 271 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) 3 
E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency v. Broderick, 
522 P.2d 144 (Utah 1974) 28 
Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 
1981) 13 
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co,, 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 
1979) 28 
First Sec. Bank v. Shiew. 609 P.2d 952 
(Utah 1980) 12, 13 
Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 
P.2d 542 (Utah 1987) 20 
In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339 (9th 
Cir. 1983) 22 
Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192 (Utah 1978) . . . . 14 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992) 14 
Prichard v. Clay. 780 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1989) 24 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991) 27 
Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) 1 
Trucker Sales Corp. v. Potter. 137 P.2d 370 (Utah 1943) . . 13 
Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985) 28 
United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 681 P.2d 390 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) 15, 24 
Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas 
Co_^ , 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) 27 
iv 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104(5) (1997) . . . . . . 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1986) 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1996) . 1 
v 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES 
There are only two issues before this Court. Both are 
straightforward and involve only the interpretation of written 
agreements: 
I. Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs on the issue of whether the defendants complied 
with specific language of a trust deed in order obtain security 
under that trust deed for additional loans that were made nearly 
two years after the trust deed was executed? Because this issue 
involves a grant of summary judgment, the plaintiffs agree that 
review of this issue is under a "standard of correctness." Stien 
v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 377 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) . 
II. Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs on the issue of whether defendant Peterson was 
entitled to default interest under the terms of a promissory note 
whose due date was amended to a later time? This issue is also 
reviewed on a "standard of correctness." Stien. 944 P.2d at 377. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
This appeal turns solely on the language of the parties' 
written agreements. There are no statutes, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This appeal involves a dispute between plaintiffs Robert L. 
Harrington and Harrington Properties, Inc. ("HPI") and defendant 
Marilyn Hamilton Peterson over their respective rights and 
remedies arising out of the development and*sale of a house built 
by plaintiffs on an undeveloped lot sold to them by Peterson (the 
"Sunset Oaks Property"). Mrs. Peterson sold the lot to HPI 
pursuant to a promissory note (the "Peterson Note'") that was 
secured by a second-position deed of trust on the Sunset Oaks 
Property (the "Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II"). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court. 
On July 26, 1994, the plaintiffs filed their Complaint 
seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgment with respect to several 
issues arising out of the sale of the Sunset Oaks Property. (R. 
I.)1 
On July 17, 1996, plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of whether subsequent advances made by 
defendant Peterson to Harrington in and after February 1993 were 
secured by the June 21, 1991 Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II as claimed 
by defendant Peterson. (R. 783.) On December 10, 1996, the 
court entered an order granting plaintiffs' motion. (R. 1038-
1041.) In granting that motion, the district court determined 
*A11 references to the record are to the page numbers of the 
original record as paginated by the clerk of the district court 
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) (2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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that certain monies loaned in 1993 by defendant Peterson to 
plaintiff HPI were not secured by the 1991 Sunset Oaks Trust Deed 
II. 
On March 4, 1997# plaintiffs filed a second motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether an agreement 
between the parties dated December 8, 1992, extended the due date 
on the Peterson Note so as to preclude default and default 
interest from accruing prior to February 22, 1994. (R. 1057-
1059.) On June 25, 1997, the district court entered an order 
granting that motion. (R. 1130-34.) 
On August 1, 1997, the parties filed a stipulation for an 
order dismissing all other issues. This stipulation was based 
upon a settlement that allowed defendants to appeal these two 
issues and that reserved the issue of attorney fees. (R. 1137-
38.) The district court entered a judgment and order of 
dismissal in accordance with the stipulation on August 7, 1997.2 
(R. 1139-41.) 
2In their factual recitation, defendants set out a number of 
asserted "facts" that are irrelevant to the issues on appeal and 
that relate solely to the claims that defendants settled for 
consideration. Such argument is improper. Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration. 909 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (parties 
cannot contest issues on appeal that are conceded below), aff'd, 
944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997). Therefore plaintiffs do not address 
those facts herein. 
3 
Statement of Facts.3 
The following facts were undisputed before the district 
court in connection with the motions for partial summary 
judgment: 
1. In early 1991, Mr. Harrington became aware of a listing 
for sale by defendant Peterson of the Sunset Oaks Property. (R. 
409.) 
2. Mr. Harrington contacted Mrs. Peterson and expressed 
interest in purchasing the Sunset Oaks Property for the purpose 
of building a house for resale. Mr. Harrington offered to buy 
the property for $95,000 if Mrs. Peterson would subordinate her 
trust deed to the anticipated construction loan trust deed, to 
which she agreed. (R. 409.) 
3. In anticipation of the closing on the Sunset Oaks 
Property, Mr. Harrington applied for a construction loan with 
Guardian State Bank, to be secured by a first trust deed on the 
Sunset Oaks Property. (R. 412.) 
4. On June 21, 1991, Mr. Harrington acquired the Sunset 
Oaks Property from Mrs. Peterson for $95,000,00, by executing a 
promissory note in that amount payable to Mrs. Peterson (the 
"Peterson Note"). (R. at 411.) A copy of the Peterson Note is 
included in the Addendum hereto at Tab A. 
defendants do not contend on appeal that the district court 
Qrred in granting summary judgment because there were material 
facts in dispute. Rather, defendants argue only that the 
district court erred with respect to its legal rulings. 
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5. In the two places for an interest term to be inserted 
in the form note, the abbreviation "N/A" was typed in. (R. 428.) 
6. Payment of the Peterson Note was secured by a second-
position Deed of Trust on the Sunset Oaks Property (the "Sunset 
Oaks Trust Deed II"). (Id.) A copy of the Sunset Oaks Trust 
Deed is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab B. 
7. The Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II states: 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $95,000, 
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the 
time, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, 
and any extension and/or renewals or modifications thereof; 
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein 
contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or 
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his 
successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note 
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of 
Trust: and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced 
by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, 
together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
(R. at 430 (emphasis added).) 
8. Almost immediately after the closing, the project ran 
into delays.4 (R. 414-15.) Because of these delays and 
increased construction costs, Mr. Harrington informed Mrs. 
Peterson in September 1992 that the proposed construction could 
4First, the subdivision's Architectural Design Committee did 
not approve the proposed design of the house until October 17, 
1991, with minor modifications. Then, HPI discovered that the 
proposed location was solid "fill" to a significant depth, 
preventing the pouring of foundations as originally designed and 
requiring excavation to a much deeper level, removing all the 
fill material and hauling in new dirt. The fill problem also 
forced HPI to pour large concrete columns and supports as part of 
the foundation, to use more steel and to change the deck design 
to larger logs. These and other unexpected problems delayed 
construction and increased costs. 
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not be completed without additional funds. Mr. Harrington told 
Mrs. Peterson that he had no other funds available to finish the 
project because of his recently filed personal bankruptcy, but 
that he would work with her in any way to complete it. It was 
then proposed that Mrs. Peterson advance up to an additional 
$75,000 for construction. (R. 417.) 
9. As a result, Harrington, HPI, and Peterson entered into 
a written agreement on December 8, 1992 (the "December 8 
Agreement"). A copy of the December 8 Agreement 'is included in 
the Addendum hereto at Tab C. That agreement provides in part as 
follows: 
4. Payment Due Date: Payment of the sum owed by 
Harrington under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note 
($95,000) and payment of the sums advanced by Peterson under 
the terms of this Agreement (not to exceed an additional 
$75,000) shall be due on the date the Property is sold by 
the Owner or is otherwise transferred, conveyed or assigned. 
The parties agree that Peterson's sole recourse to 
recover the sums of money advanced by her under the terms of 
this Agreement, plus interest and attorney fees, and to 
recover the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000) 
owed to her under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note, 
shall be against the Property and/or the proceeds arising 
from its sale or transfer. 
(R. 450 (emphasis added).) 
10. In February 1993, the parties reached an understanding 
in which Mrs. Peterson agreed to provide additional funds to 
complete construction on the house. Mr. Harrington sent a letter 
dated February 18, 1993 (the "February 18 Letter Agreement")5 to 
5In paragraph 28 of her Affidavit, Mrs. Peterson states that 
she loaned "additional" monies "pursuant to a new letter 
agreement signed by Robert L. Harrington dated February 18, 1993. 
(R. 178.) 
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Mrs. Peterson. (R. 178, 890.) A copy of the February 18 Letter 
Agreement is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab D. 
11. Mrs. Peterson received the February 18 Letter Agreement 
but took no action to respond to it except to advance additional 
funds. (R. 890.) 
12. The February 18 Letter Agreement' states: 
This letter will confirm that any money advanced by you, 
above and beyond the $75,000 (December 8, 1992 Agreement), 
for the purpose of construction of the home located at 1656 
South Sunset Oaks Dr., will be returned to you with interest 
consistent with the rate of interest in our Agreement dated 
December 8, 1992, and will be returned to you prior to the 
distribution of any proceeds to Harrington Properties, Inc. 
The sale of the house will be the sole source of the return 
of this money. 
(R. at 224.) 
13. The February 18 Letter Agreement and the checks 
provided by Mrs. Peterson are the only written documents relating 
to an agreement of the parties in February 1993 for Peterson to 
advance additional monies. (R. 814.) 
14. Pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement, defendant 
Peterson "loaned the additional sum of $69,626.84 . . . ." (R. 
178, 814.) 
15. There was no promissory note reflecting the $69,626.84 
loaned pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement, nor is there 
any document reciting that the monies loaned pursuant to that 
letter agreement are secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. 
(R. 814-15.) 
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16. At no time did Mr. Harrington ever agree that the funds 
advanced pursuant to that February 18 Letter Agreement would be 
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. (R. 815.) 
17. On December 5, 1993, Mr. Harrington received an offer 
to purchase the Sunset Oaks Property for $472,500. 
Mr. Harrington accepted the offer, and the sale was closed on 
February 24, 1994. (R. 422, 882.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants challenge on several theories the district 
court's award of partial summary judgment that the Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II did not secure their advances in and after February 
1993. First, defendants argue that clause (3) of the trust deed, 
specifically addressed to "additional loans or advances hereafter 
. . . made to Trustor," does not control because the loans were 
not "unrelated." However, neither the word "unrelated" nor its 
concept can be found in the language of clause (3). Second, 
defendants argue, on various creative readings, that clauses (1), 
(2), and (4) of the trust deed also govern this transaction. As 
discussed below, defendants' position is contrary to the plain 
language of the trust deed and reads out of the trust deed clause 
(3)'s specific application to "additional advances." Third, 
defendants argue that even if clause (3) controls, the February 
18 Letter Agreement "meets the requirements of a promissory note, 
and indicates a grant of a security interest in the Sunset Oaks 
Property." Brief of Appellants at 14. However, the February 18 
Letter Agreement at most only provides that "the sale of the 
8 
house will be the sole source of the return of this money" and 
makes absolutely no mention of being "secured by [the Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II]." Moreover, defendants' argument is further 
contradicted by the parties' practical interpretation of the 
trust deed in the December 8 Agreement, drafted by Peterson's 
counsel, which complies with clause (3) in reciting that the 
additional advances therein are collateralized by the Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II. 
II. Defendants also challenge the district court's grant of 
partial summary judgment that no default interest accrued on the 
Peterson Note prior to February 24, 1994, the amended due date of 
the note. Defendants concede that no interest accrued between 
June 21, 1991, and March 21, 1992, the original due date of the 
loan, because "N/A" was typed in the blanks for the applicable 
interest rate. Brief of Appellants at 14. Defendants argue that 
they are entitled to default interest from March 21, 1992, 
forward, even though the December 8 Agreement extended the due 
date of the Peterson Note to the "date the property is sold," 
because the December 8 Agreement "neither forgives nor excuses 
interest on that Note." Id. at 15. However, by that amendment, 
the Peterson Note was not and could not be in default until the 
end of its term, i.e., the date the property was sold (February 
24, 1994). Moreover, the December 8 Agreement confirms in its 
other provisions that the amount to be paid on the Peterson Note 
on the due date was the principal amount of $95,000 only. The 
only interest mentioned in that agreement relates exclusively to 
9 
the new monies advanced and not to the Peterson Note. Therefore, 
no interest, default or otherwise, applied to the Peterson Note 
between June 21, 1991, and February 24, 1994. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE FEBRUARY 1993 
ADDITIONAL ADVANCES WERE NOT SECURED BY THE SUNSET OAKS 
TRUST DEED II, 
Granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, 
the district court held that the monies loaned by defendant 
Peterson pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement were not 
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.6 For the reasons set 
forth below, this Court should affirm the district court's 
decision. 
A. The District Court Properly Held that the Additional 
Advances are Governed by Clause (3) of the Trust Deed. 
1. The plain language of clause (3) applies to the 
February 1993 advances. 
The Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II provides that it is for the 
purpose of securing four categories of payments, as follows: 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $95,000, 
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the 
time, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, 
and any extension and/or renewals or modifications thereof; 
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein 
contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or 
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his 
successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note 
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of 
defendants loaned $69,626.84 pursuant to the February 18 
Letter Agreement. Of that amount, summary judgment was granted 
as to all but $4,898.81, payment of which to Guardian State Bank 
by defendants was secured by clause (2) of the trust deed. 
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Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced 
by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, 
together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
Addendum, Tab B. 
In interpreting the plain language of this trust deed, the 
district court held: 
The Court finds that the monies advanced by defendant 
Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 letter were 
"additional loans or advances" within the meaning of clause 
(3), and that clause (3) applies to the monies loaned or 
advanced by Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 
letter agreement, except as to the $4,89 8.81 paid to 
Guardian State Bank, which payments were secured under 
clause (2) of the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II by reference to 
paragraph 5 thereof. 
(R. 1043-44.) This holding of the district court is correct and 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
The monies advanced by defendant Peterson pursuant to the 
February 18 Letter Agreement clearly constitute "additional loans 
or advances." The trust deed itself states that it secures 
"payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of 
even date hereof in the principal sum of $95,000.00," i.e., the 
Peterson Note. The monies advanced pursuant to the February 18 
Letter Agreement are thus subsequent and additional to that 
original June 1991 note amount for purchase of the undeveloped 
lot, and, as a matter of law, they are therefore "additional 
loans" within the meaning of clause (3) of the trust deed. 
2. Clause (3) of the trust deed is not limited to 
"unrelated" loans or advances. 
In an effort to avoid the plain language of clause (3), 
defendants argue that clause (3) "address[es] only new, 
subsequent loans, unrelated in purpose to the amount originally 
11 
secured by the Trust Deed." Brief of Appellants at 16 (emphasis 
added). But there is no such limiting language in clause (3) or 
elsewhere in the trust deed. Since neither the word "unrelated" 
nor its concept can be found in clause (3) or in the trust deed, 
defendants' argument on unrelatedness impermissibly seeks to 
amend clause (3).7 
Defendants further argue that "the law is clear that later 
advances are secured by an earlier trust deed or mortgage if 
those advances are related to the same transaction as that 
secured by the original instrument." Brief of Appellants at 16. 
For this sweeping legal proposition, defendants rely solely on 
the case of First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 
(Utah 1980). Defendants' argument is flawed in multiple ways. 
First, the defendants distort and misapply the Shiew case. 
In Shiew, the Utah Supreme Court considered the "proper 
interpretation" of a "dragnet clause" in a mortgage. 609 P.2d at 
954. The clause in that case was extremely broad and stated that 
the mortgage was "'to secure any and all claims or demands now 
due or to become due now or hereafter contracted or incurred 
which the said mortgagee or the holder hereof, from time to time, 
may have or hold against the mortgagors."" Id. at 953. There is 
no such "dragnet clause" in the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. 
Indeed, the trust deed contains a provision that is directly 
7Even if defendants' argument were correct, the 1993 
advances relate to the construction loan (Guardian State Bank) 
and not to the Peterson Note for the purchase of the undeveloped 
lot. 
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contrary to the one in Shiew. Instead of covering "any and all 
claims," the trust deed covers only promissory notes that 
specifically refer to the trust deed and state that they are 
secured by it. Thus, Shiew has no applicability to this case. 
Moreover, even if it were otherwise applicable, the only 
effect of the Shiew decision is to reject securitization of 
unrelated loans by a dragnet clause. Shiew in no way suggests 
that if a loan is related to a prior loan, it is secured despite 
specific language in the trust deed to the contrary. 
Further, not only is the Shiew decision inapplicable, the 
defendant' own conduct demonstrates a construction of the trust 
deed at odds with their current position.8 In the December 8 
Agreement, by which defendant Peterson has previously agreed to 
advance an additional $75,000, the parties included a specific 
paragraph that provides: "This Agreement is secured by a Trust 
Deed dated June 21, 1991, more particularly referred to in 
Paragraph 1 [sic] above." December 8 Agreement, f 8; Addendum, 
Tab C. That agreement was drafted by counsel for defendant 
Peterson.9 The only plausible purpose of that language would 
have been no need to comply with clause (3) of the trust deed. 
8Under Utah law the subsequent conduct of the parties may be 
referenced as a tool of interpretation. See Trucker Sales Corp. 
v. Potter, 137 P.2d 370, 371-72 (Utah 1943); see also Eie v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981). 
defendants suggest that defendant Peterson was an 
inexperienced person in business while Mr. Harrington was an 
attorney. While this point has no legal significance, it is 
misleading. Mrs. Peterson is the president of her own business 
and was represented by counsel, Mr. Verhaaren, with respect to 
that agreement. 
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If defendants' arguments on clauses (1) , (2), and (4) were 
correct, there was no need for paragraph 8 in the December 8 
Agreement. The inclusion of that language by defendants then 
contradicts their position now. 
3. Clauses (1), (2), and (4) of the trust deed do not 
apply to the February 1993 advances. 
Clauses (1), (2), and (4) of the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II 
do not apply to the February 1993 advances made by Mrs. Peterson. 
First, applying any of those clauses necessarily reads clause (3) 
out of the agreement. Second, by their own terms, clauses (1), 
(2), and (4) have no application here. 
A contract, such as a trust deed,10 must be construed so as 
to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions. See, e.g., 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992); Minshew v. 
Chevron Oil Co.. 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978). Defendants' 
efforts to construe clauses (1), (2), and (4) to encompass an 
advance that is both subsequent and additional to the original 
loan impermissibly conflicts with clause (3)'s specific and 
express applicability to "additional loans or advances hereafter 
made." Defendants' arguments thus would require a court to read 
clause (3) out of the trust deed. However, the law requires that 
all four clauses be read in relation to each other and so as to 
give effect to each. Id. The language of clause (3) is not only 
plain and unambiguous, it is specific in its application to 
10Under Utah law, trust deeds are construed and interpreted 
as contracts. See, e.g., Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 
540 (Utah 1977); see also 55 AM.JUR. 320, "Mortgages," § 175 
(1971). 
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"additional advances hereafter made." That specific language 
governs over the generalized interpretation that defendants try 
to give to the other clauses of the trust deed. See United Cal. 
Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 390, 425 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983). 
Further, clauses (1), (2), and (4) do hot apply on their 
face to additional advances. Without any explanation or 
authority, defendants assert that "Mrs. Peterson's later advances 
are properly viewed as . . . a modification" of the original note 
under clause (1). Brief of Appellants at 19. But, even without 
clause (3), such an assertion is clearly erroneous, since 
"modification" means some "alteration, adjustment or limitation" 
to the original Note. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, p. 843 
(1950). No such alteration, adjustment, or change ever occurred 
to the Peterson Note or Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. 
Defendants next assert, citing clause (2) of the trust deed, 
that the February 1993 advances "relate to the performance of 
each of the provisions of the Trust Deed which the Trustor, 
Harrington, agreed to perform." Id. Defendants then reference a 
later provision of the trust deed, which they contend sets out 
agreed-upon performance by the Trustor linking back to clause 
(2). The later provision, cited by defendants, states in part: 
To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust, Trustor 
Agrees: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and 
repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to 
complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike 
manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or 
destroyed thereon; . . . to do all other acts which from the 
15 
character or use of said property may be reasonably 
necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding 
the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part 
hereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing 
construction of improvements on said property, Trustor 
further agrees: 
(a) to commence construction promptly and to pursue 
same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance 
with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, 
and 
(b) to allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at 
all times during construction. 
Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, p. 2; Addendum, Tab B. Defendants 
then argue, without explanation, that "because Mrs. Peterson's 
advances fulfilled the performance of Harrington's obligations 
under the Peterson Trust Deed, these advances are also secured by 
the . . . Trust Deed under this second category." Brief of 
Appellants at 19-20. However, defendants clearly misread the 
quoted paragraph. The purpose of the provision is set forth in 
its title: "To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust. . . 
." It is undisputed that the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II was given 
to secure a purchase of raw land and not to secure a construction 
loan; indeed, defendants repeatedly describe the trust deed as a 
purchase money deed of trust. Plaintiffs therefore could have no 
obligation under the trust deed to maintain a structure or 
complete construction on a structure that did not exist at the 
time of the purchase. 
In addition, paragraph 1 of the quoted language does not 
apply to this loan because the Peterson Note was not a 
construction loan. Paragraph 1 states: "if the loan secured 
hereby or any part hereof is being obtained for the purpose of 
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financing construction of improvements on said property. Trustor 
further agrees . . . to commence construction and to pursue same 
with reasonable diligence to completion . . . ." Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II, p. 2 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the 
Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II was not obtained "for the purpose of 
financing construction." Indeed, it was subordinated to the 
first-position trust deed on the Sunset Oaks Property, which was 
given to secure the Guardian State Bank construction loan. 
Therefore, the performances argued for by defendants under clause 
(2) are inapplicable to the Peterson Note, which was given to 
purchase raw land and was indisputably not a construction loan. 
Finally, defendants contend that clause (4) of the trust 
deed collateralizes the February 1993 advances because the 
advances were "sums expended or advanced . . . under or pursuant 
to the terms" of the trust deed. Citing paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
the trust deed, defendants argue that defendant Peterson was 
"apprehensive" about a premature sale of the property before 
construction was substantially completed and that she therefore 
"advanced further sums to complete construction" and improve the 
potential of a maximum sales price. Brief of Appellants at 20-
21. Whatever may have been defendant Peterson's reasoning for 
the advances, her motives do not convert or transform the nature 
of the February 1993 advances from being an "additional loan or 
advance" under clause (3) to a "sum advanced under or pursuant to 
the terms of the Trust Deed" under clause (4). 
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This can be seen by examining the language of paragraphs 7 
and 8, upon which defendants rely, which reads as follows: 
To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust. Trustor 
Agrees: 
• * * 
(7) Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do 
any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or, trustee but 
without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand 
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any 
obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner 
and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect 
the security hereof, . . . and in exercising any such 
powers, incur any liability, expend whatever* amounts in its 
absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, 
including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay 
his reasonable fees. 
(8) To pay immediately and without demand all sums 
expended hereunder by Beneficiary or trustee, with interest 
from date of expenditure at the rate of percent per 
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby. 
Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, p. 2; Addendum, Tab B (emphasis 
added). Contrary to defendants' assertion, paragraph 7 is not a 
carte blanche authorization for the beneficiary to expend monies 
as the Beneficiary deems necessary to protect the security. 
Rather, it is expressly limited in its opening clause: "Should 
Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act herein 
provided. . . . " (emphasis added). In the event of such a 
failure, the Beneficiary then and only then "may: Make or do the 
same in such manner . . . ," and have the trust deed as 
collateral therefor. Thus, Peterson was entitled to expend or 
advance sums, within the meaning of clause (4), only if 
Harrington failed to make a payment or do an act "herein 
provided." For example, if the Trustor (Harrington) failed "to 
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provide and maintain insurance" (1 2) or "to pay . . . all taxes 
and assessments" (1 5), then Peterson could step in and advance 
those payments. See I SUMMARY OF UTAH PROPERTY LAW § 9.61 
(1978). The February 1993 advances to complete construction of 
the house, however, were clearly not "payments" or an "act" 
provided for in the trust deed, and defendants point to no 
specific predicate payment or act "under" the trust deed. The 
very same analysis applies to paragraph 8, since it relates to 
"sums expended hereunder." 
Thus, even if clause (3) did not specifically cover 
additional advances and as a consequence control the analysis, on 
the plain language of clauses (1), (2), and (4), defendants' 
arguments fail as well. 
4. The district court properly rejected Peterson's 
argument that she intended the advances to be 
secured by the trust deed. 
Defendants assert that Mrs. Peterson's "intent and 
expectation" was that the February 1993 advances would be secured 
by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, Brief of Appellants at 21, and 
that she understood the February 18 Letter Agreement granted a 
security interest in that trust deed. Id. at 23. 
Peterson apparently claims that the parties orally agreed to 
secure her February 1993 advances with a deed of trust on the 
Sunset Oaks Property. First, there is no mention of any such 
agreement or understanding in the February 18 Letter Agreement 
itself. Second, under Utah law, such oral agreements may not be 
used to enforce monetary obligations against real property. 
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Therefore, the only agreement relative to the February 1993 
advances properly before this Court is the February 18 Letter 
Agreement. 
Peterson's theoretical alleged oral agreement would 
contravene the statute of frauds. That statute provides as 
follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995). It is well settled that the 
statute of frauds requires that "an agreement to secure an 
obligation with real property" must be in writing. Hector, Inc. 
v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987). 
B, The District Court Correctly Ruled that the February 18 
Letter Agreement Does Not Meet the Requirements of 
Clause (3). 
As demonstrated above, the district court correctly held 
that this case is governed by clause (3) of the trust deed. 
Turning to the application of clause (3), the district court 
correctly ruled that the requirements of clause (3) were not met. 
The trust deed makes clear in clause (3) that "additional 
loans or advances" to the trustor are secured by the trust deed 
only "when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that 
they are secured by that Deed of Trust." Thus, there are two 
requirements: 1) there must be a promissory note, and 2) the 
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promissory note must state that it is secured by the Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II. As shown below, neither requirement is satisfied 
here. 
•.-!••• The only document setting forth the parties' 
agreement regarding the February 1993 advances is 
the February 18 Letter Agreement. 
The district court held: 
The Court finds that the February 18, 1993 letter from 
Robert L. Harrington to Marilyn Hamilton Peterson is the 
only document which reflects the agreement between the 
parties with respect to the advances made by defendant 
Peterson after those covered by the December 8, 1992 
Agreement. 
(R. 1044.) Defendants do not challenge this finding on appeal. 
Therefore, the only question is whether the February 18 Letter 
Agreement constitutes a promissory note that recites that it is 
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. 
2. The February 18 Letter Agreement is not a 
promissory note. 
Although the district court did not decide whether the 
February 18 Letter Agreement constitutes a promissory note, it is 
clear that it does not, and this Court may affirm the decision of 
the district court for any reason.11 
As stated above, the only written agreement memorializing or 
reflecting defendant Peterson's loan of the $69,626 in February 
1993 is the February 18 Letter Agreement. That agreement 
provides that "the sale of the house will be the sole source of 
the return of this money." It contains no promise to pay by HPI 
"See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988) . 
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or Harrington. Thus, the letter agreement is not a promissory 
note, since there is no personal or corporate promise to pay the 
loan- See, e.g.. In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 
1339, 1347 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A 'promissory note' is itself merely 
'a promise or engagement, in writing, to pay a specified sum at a 
time therein limited . . . to a person therein named, or to his 
order, or bearer.'", citing Black's Law Dictionary 1093); see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104(5) (1997). 
The February 18 Letter Agreement is clear and unambiguous on 
its face. It reads in its entirety as follows: 
This letter will confirm that any money advanced by 
you, above and beyond the $75,000 (December 8, 1992 
Agreement), for the purpose of construction of the home 
located at 1656 South Sunset Oaks Dr., will be returned to 
you with interest consistent with the rate of interest in 
our Agreement dated December 8, 1992, and will be returned 
to you prior to the distribution of any proceeds to 
Harrington Properties, Inc. The sale of the house will be 
the sole source of the return of this money. 
Tab 4. Significantly, defendants did not ever request 
preparation of a promissory note for the monies advanced in 1993 
or of any document reciting that the additional loans were 
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. The reason for that 
failure is obvious--the February 18 Letter Agreement did not 
contemplate or provide for it. 
3. The February 18 Letter Agreement does not recite 
that it is secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed 
II. 
Finally, the February 18 Letter Agreement does not recite 
that the February 1993 advances are secured by the Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II. Thus, whether or not the February 18 Letter 
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Agreement can be construed to be a promissory note, it is clear, 
as a matter of law, that it does not comply with the requirements 
of clause (3) of the trust deed. 
Defendants nevertheless argue that the February 18 Letter 
Agreement "should properly be viewed as the equivalent of both a 
promissory note and a grant of security interest." Brief of 
Appellants at 23. For purposes of their security interest 
argument, defendants rely solely on the last sentence of the 
letter agreement's first paragraph, which states:' "The sale of 
the house will be the sole source of the return of this money." 
Defendants then argue that "any lay person reading that sentence 
would understand that language to be the equivalent of a grant of 
a security interest in the property, which is the subject of the 
Deed of Trust. . . . " Id. 
However, defendants completely misread that sentence, since 
it nowhere references either a security interest or the Sunset 
Oaks Trust Deed II. Specifically that sentence does not "recite" 
or otherwise reference in any possible way that the advances "are 
secured by [the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II]." Indeed, the last 
sentence means just what it states, that Peterson may only look 
to the proceeds from the sale of the house for the return of this 
money and not to Harrington personally or to the property.12 
12Even if defendants were correct that the last sentence 
created a security interest in the Sunset Oaks Property, at most 
it would be an independent security interest with its own 
priority, and not tied back to the trust deed. 
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Thus, the February 18 Letter Agreement does not comply in any 
sense with clause (3) of the Trust Deed. 
In a strained effort to satisfy the requirements of clause 
(3) , defendants next argue that the February 1983 Letter 
Agreement incorporates the December 8 Agreement. Defendants 
suggest that the December 8 Agreement and the February 18 Letter 
Agreement jointly "memorialize the parties' understanding and 
agreement" on later advances. Brief of Appellants at 22. 
However the February 18 Letter Agreement does not incorporate or 
join in the December 8 Agreement. The February 18 Letter 
Agreement specifically references only one portion of the 
December 8 Agreement, namely, that "any money advanced . . . will 
be returned to you with interest consistent with the rate of 
interest in our Agreement dated December 8, 1992 . . . ." Under 
principles of construction, "[a] reference in a contract to 
another document will incorporate the other document only to the 
extent indicated and for the specific purpose indicated." 
Prichard v. Clay, 780 P.2d 359, 361-62 (Alaska 1989) ("Parties do 
not undertake obligations contained in a separate document unless 
their contract clearly says so."); Accord: United Cal. Bank v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 390, 411 (Ariz. App. 1983). In the 
February 18 Letter Agreement, the sole reference to the December 
8 Agreement is to the interest term. Thus, the December 8 
Agreement is incorporated and applicable only to the extent 
indicated, i.e., the interest term. 
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This plain reading of the February 18 Letter Agreement is 
confirmed by the fact that the letter agreement contains two 
substantive terms that are also found in the December 8 
Agreement. As a logical matter, addressing those substantive 
terms would be unnecessary if the December 8 Agreement were 
incorporated therein. First, the February i8 Letter Agreement 
states that any money advanced "will be returned to you prior to 
the distribution of any proceeds to Harrington Properties, Inc." 
That provision has a similar objective to paragraph 2 of the 
December 8 Agreement, which provides: " . . . all funds advanced 
by Peterson . . . shall only be used to pay for the Work and for 
no other purpose," i.e., no payments to Harrington. Second, the 
February 18 Letter Agreement provides that "the sale of the house 
will be the sole source of the return of this money." By 
comparison, paragraph 4 of the December 8 Agreement provides: 
"Peterson's sole recourse to recover the sums of money advanced 
by her under . . . this Agreement . . . shall be against the 
Property and/or the proceeds arising from its sale or transfer." 
If, as defendants suggest, the February 18 Letter Agreement 
incorporates the December 8 Agreement, inclusion of such terms as 
well as the interest would be completely superfluous. Thus, the 
plain language of the February 18 Letter Agreement belies 
Peterson's contention and demonstrates that there is no general 
incorporation of the December 8 Agreement, 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NO INTEREST RAN ON 
THE PETERSON NOTE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 24, 1994. 
Defendants also challenge the district court's order of 
partial summary judgment determining that no interest ran on the 
Peterson Note prior to February 24, 1994, the date on which the 
Sunset Oaks Property sold. That note was in a principal amount 
of $95,000. In the two places for an interest term to be 
inserted in the form note, the Peterson Note as signed stated 
"N/A." The district court concluded, and defendants now concede, 
that language unambiguously provided for no interest to run prior 
to any default. 
The default interest blanks in the Peterson Note were also 
not filled in.13 The Peterson Note provided: "Balance due in 
nine months from date of execution." The December 8 Agreement 
between the parties unambiguously amended the due date for 
payment of the Peterson Note to the date the property was sold 
(February 24, 1994). Based on that ambiguous amendment, the 
district court held that the note thus was not in default prior 
to February 24, 1994. The district court also held that the 
December 8 Agreement made clear that no interest ran or was to be 
paid on the note until it was due. As more fully explained 
below, the district court's decision was correct and should be 
affirmed. 
13Defendants argue that the default rate of interest on the 
note should be the statutory 10% rate because the interest rate 
was left blank in the default provisions of the note. Plaintiffs 
did not contest below that the statutory 10% rate would apply to 
the blank interest term in the default section of the note if 
that section of the note were to apply. 
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A. Under Utah Law, the Construction of Unambiguous 
Contracts is a Matter of Law, 
The determination of defendants' issue requires construction 
of the December 8 Agreement. "The interpretation of a contract 
is a matter of law for the court to determine unless the contract 
is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is a 
matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the 
contract." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991). 
See also Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995).14 
B. The Peterson Note Unambicruously Provides That Interest 
is not Applicable. 
The Peterson Note was executed by the parties on July 21, 
1991. In the relevant portion of the Peterson Note, which is a 
form note with blanks to be filled in, there are two blanks 
relating to interest, one for the amount of interest on the 
principal balance to be spelled out and another in parenthesis 
for it to be typed in numerical form. In both places, the 
abbreviation "N/A" was typed in. "N/A" unambiguously means "not 
applicable." These two specific entries on the note demonstrate 
that the parties specifically agreed that interest would not be 
applicable to the $95,000 dollar principal balance in the 
Peterson Note. 
"Defendants themselves cite authority for the same 
proposition that "the intent of the parties is to be determinea 
from the writing itself" and that a court will not "look beyond 
the wording of the agreement to determine the parties intent." 
Brief of Appellants at 29 (citing cases). 
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Defendants set forth certain alleged facts relating to the 
history of negotiations leading up to and surrounding the 
execution of the Peterson Note. Brief of Appellants at 14, 24-
26. However, such arguments are improper given the unambiguous 
statement that interest is not applicable. 
Defendants do "not now claim[] interest for the time before 
the Peterson Note came due in March 1992. "15 Brief of Appellants 
at 14. However, defendants do claim that on and after March 21, 
1992, the original due date, the Peterson Note was in default and 
that default interest applied from March 21, 1992, forward, even 
15By this position, defendants concede and acknowledge that 
interest on the principal balance of the note did not apply or 
accrue between the date of the note's execution and the original 
due date of March 21, 1992. Defendants necessarily recognize 
that the "N/A" interest term is clear, unambiguous, and not 
susceptible to any attack. Even if defendants sought to vary the 
term of the Peterson Note relating to interest from "N/A" to 
"10%" by relying on contemporaneous alleged documents or oral 
discussions, that effort would be barred by the parol evidence 
rule because the "N/A" term is not ambiguous, an essential 
condition to avoid the parol evidence rule. E.g., E.A. Strout W, 
Realty Agency v. Broderick. 522 P.2d 144, 145 (Utah 1974). 
Defendants cite the case of Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 
(Utah 19 85), for the proposition that extrinsic evidence is 
"admissible on the threshold issue of whether [a] writing was 
adopted by the parties as an integration of their agreement 
. . . ." Brief of Appellants at 26 n.3. However, defendants do 
not thereafter assert that the Peterson Note was not an 
integrated contract. In fact, the Peterson Note was the "final 
expression" of the parties' agreement on the trust deed note, 
especially as to the "N/A" interest term. The Peterson Note was 
executed simultaneously with the Warranty Deed and Deed of Trust, 
which merged or integrated any prior contracts for conveyance. 
Dobruskv v. Isbell. 740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987). Accord: 
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979) 
(extinguishing prior earnest money agreement). No subsequent 
claim was made by defendant Peterson that the interest term of 
the Peterson Note was in error or was not a final expression, 
which precludes their raising it on appeal now. Finally, the 
Peterson Note was treated as a final expression in the December 8 
Agreement. 
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after the due date amendment in the December 8 Agreement. As 
discussed below, that position is contradicted by the due date 
amendment and other terms of the December 8 Agreement. 
C. The December 8 Agreement Unambiguously Modifies the Due 
Date of the Peterson Note Without Modifying the 
Interest Term, 
The December 8 Agreement addressed the"delays in the 
anticipated construction and the need for additional monies to 
finish construction. The December 8 Agreement provided that 
defendant Peterson would advance up to $75,000 in additional 
monies, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement 
also addressed payment of the $95,000 Peterson Note, and extended 
the due date on that note to the time of the sale of the 
property. In doing so, the December 8 Agreement did not in any 
way provide for any interest, default or otherwise, to run on the 
original note. 
Paragraph 4 of the December 8 Agreement, which specifically 
addresses these issues, reads as follows: 
Payment of the sum owed by Harrington under the terms 
of the original Trust Deed Note ($95,000) and payment of the 
sums advanced by Peterson under the terms of this Agreement 
(not to exceed an additional $75,000) shall be due on the 
date the property is sold by the Owner or is otherwise 
transferred, conveyed or assigned. 
The parties agree that Peterson's sole recourse to 
recover the sums of money advanced by her under the terms of 
this Agreement, plus interest and attorneys' fees, and to 
recover the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000) 
owed to her under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note, 
shall be against the Property and/or the proceeds arising 
from its sale or transfer. 
December 8 Agreement, 1 4, Addendum, Tab C. 
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The first sentence of paragraph 4 provides that both the 
original Peterson Note and the new monies advanced under the 
December 8 Agreement "shall be due on the date the property is 
sold by Owner." That sentence clearly and unambiguously extends 
the "due date" for the Peterson Note to the date of closing, an 
express modification of the nine-month due date in the Peterson 
Note. Thus, interest on that note was "not applicable" until the 
due date of the sale of the Sunset Oaks Property, i.e., February 
24, 1994. 
In addition, the December 8 Agreement does not amend the 
Peterson Note to bear ongoing interest nor otherwise suggest that 
interest runs on the note. To the contrary, it affirms there is 
no interest component. That interest is "not applicable" in the 
Peterson Note is affirmed by the second part of paragraph 4, 
which provides that Mrs. Peterson's sole recourse is to recover: 
. . . the sums of money advanced by her under the terms 
of this Agreement, plus interest and attorneys' fees, and to 
recover the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000) 
(emphasis added). Id. This sentence specifically mentions 
interest on the monies advanced under the December 8 Agreement 
but omits any reference to interest on the $95,000 Peterson Note. 
The omission of reference to interest on the $95,000 Note, when 
interest is specifically referenced with respect to the new 
monies advanced pursuant to the December 8 Agreement, confirms 
that no interest on the Peterson Note was contemplated by the 
parties. 
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Notwithstanding that the due date for the Peterson Note was 
amended by the December 8 Agreement to the date of the property 
sale, defendants argue that default interest from March 21, 1992, 
to December 8, 1992, continued to be owed by Harrington because 
the December 8 Agreement did not explicitly forgive or excuse it. 
Brief of Appellants at 28. Defendants argue that fl[a]bsent some 
sort of express additional language clarifying that merely 
postponing the payment date was also meant to excuse interest on 
a long-overdue obligation, such intention should 'not be read into 
the clear language of the document."16 Id. at 28. Defendants' 
position is wrong on several grounds. 
First, the December 8 Agreement amended the "due date" of 
the Peterson Note. Thus, the note, as amended, was not and could 
not be in default until the end of its term, namely, the sale of 
the property. As a logical matter, it is impossible for the 
Peterson Note to have a due date in the future and also be in 
default. For that reason, there was no need for the parties to 
"excuse" any default interest once the note was amended.17 
16Defendants contended before the district court that default 
interest applied even after the amendment of the due date in the 
December 8 Agreement since they asked that court for a 
declaration that "interest does accrue on the $95,000 of the 
original Peterson Note from March 21, 1992 forward." (R. at 
1087.) 
17Defendants argue that the December 8 Agreement was silent 
on the issue of excusing the prior default interest and that such 
silence should not be presumed to eliminate such interest. 
Defendants cite no authority for that presumption and are wrong. 
First, as discussed herein, the December 8 Agreement is not 
silent on the issue of any prior default interest because it 
expressly states that the sum payable on the amended due date is 
$95,000. Second, even if the December 8 Agreement was "silent", 
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Second, in amending the due date of the Peterson Note, 
paragraph 4 of the December 8 Agreement is explicit on the amount 
to be paid on the amended due date. Paragraph 4 reads: "Payment 
of the sum owed by Harrington under the terms of the original 
Trust Deed Note ($95,000) . . . shall be due on the date the 
Property is sold . . . ." This language is clear and unambiguous 
that the amount to be paid on the due date was $95,000, not 
$95,000 plus default or other interest. 
Third, defendants assert that paragraph 3 of the December 8 
Agreement, which contains at the end of the first sentence the 
phrase, "plus accruing interest," indicates that interest was 
already then accruing on the Peterson Note. Brief of Appellants 
at 27. Once again, defendants' argument misreads the language of 
the referenced paragraph. That paragraph reads: 
3. Obligation of Harrington and Owner: In addition to the 
payment of the sum of Ninety Five Thousand Dollars 
($95,000.00) owed to her on the original Trust Deed Note 
dated June 21, 1991, Peterson shall be entitled to the 
payment of all sums advanced by her pursuant to the terms of 
this Agreement together with attorney fees incurred by her 
relating in any way to the negotiations for and preparation 
of this Agreement, plus accruing interest. Interest on the 
unpaid balance of each sum advanced by Peterson pursuant to 
paragraph 1 above shall be calculated from the date each sum 
has been advanced by her until she had been repaid in full 
at the prime rate then charged by Valley Bank and Trust 
Company plus four (4) percentage points. 
December 8 Agreement, ^ 3 (emphasis added); Addendum, Tab C. The 
phrase, "plus accruing interest," can only be read as applying 
solely to new monies advanced for several reasons. The 
the more reasonable inference from such silence is that the 
amended due date eliminated any default status and interest 
related thereto. 
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introductory phrase, "[i]n addition to," clarifies that the new 
monies being advanced pursuant to the agreement are "in addition" 
to the original $95,000. Everything after "June 21, 1991," in 
that first sentence then addresses the new monies advanced 
pursuant to the agreement, i.e., the $75,000. The phrase, "plus 
accruing interest," applies to the new monies advanced pursuant 
to the Agreement because it is placed at the end of the sentence 
in conjunction with the concept of "sums advanced . . . pursuant 
to the terms of this Agreement." It is simply a 'strained and 
unwarranted reading to apply it to the $95,000 mentioned at the 
first of the sentence. 
Defendants also suggest that the phrase, "plus accruing 
interest," must be read as "signif[ying] that interest was 
already then accruing . . . ." Id. However, that phrase is 
better read to refer to interest which accrues in the future on 
monies advanced under the agreement, which in fact makes more 
sense in the context of the entire paragraph. 
Finally, and most persuasively, the phrase, "plus accruing 
interest," is further clarified by the second sentence of 
paragraph 3, which describes the amount of the interest referred 
to in the preceding sentence and how it shall be calculated as to 
"the unpaid balance of each sum advanced by Peterson pursuant to 
paragraph 1 above . . . " Since paragraph 1 of the agreement 
refers only to the new monies to be advanced not to exceed 
$75,000, it confirms that interest does not apply to the Peterson 
Note. 
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This reading of the December 8 Agreement is confirmed by the 
second sentence of paragraph 4, which reads as follows: 
The parties agree that Peterson's sole recourse to recover 
the sums of money advanced by her under the terms of this 
Agreement, plus interest and attorney fees, and to recover 
the sum of Ninety Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000.00) owed to 
her under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note, shall 
be against the property and/or the proceeds arising from its 
sale or transfer. 
December 8 Agreement, ^ 4 (emphasis added); Addendum, Tab C. The 
placement of the phrase, "plus interest," after the reference to 
"sums of money advanced by her under the terms of this Agreement" 
and before the reference to the original trust deed note can only 
be read as indicating that interest was to run on the sums 
advanced under the agreement but not on the trust deed note. The 
word, "and," following the reference to interest makes clear that 
interest applies only to the sums advanced under the agreement. 
Thus, the second sentence of paragraph 4 supports the 
interpretation that no interest ran on the Peterson Note. 
The December 8 Agreement clearly and unambiguously amended 
the due date of the Peterson Note, and that note could not be in 
default until the amended due date accrued. The December 8 
Agreement further recognized that no default or other interest 
had accrued or would accrue on the Peterson Note. 
III. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES. 
Plaintiffs seek an award of their attorneys' fees on appeal. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of their attorneys' fees with 
respect to defendants' wrongful claim that the Sunset Oaks Trust 
Deed II secured the February 1993 advances and thus was in 
34 
default by that amount. Paragraph 19 of the trust deed provides 
for a "recover[y]" of a "reasonable attorney's fee" in the event 
of "any default hereunder." Addendum, Tab B. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5 (1986), plaintiffs have a 
reciprocal right of recovery as the prevailing party for disputes 
under the trust deed. 
With respect to the interest issue, which involves 
interpretation of the December 8 Agreement on the amendment of 
the due date, paragraph 6 of that agreement provides that 
defendant Peterson "shall be entitled to" recover all costs 
incurred in enforcing the terms hereof, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees . . . ." Under the statutory principle of 
-reciprocal rights, plaintiffs would be entitled to recover their 
attorneys' fees if they prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
declaratory judgment of the district court. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of March, 1998. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
/ 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
Eric D. Barton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
35 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
•A I certify that on the Z7 day of March, 1998, I have 
caused to be hand-delivered two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to the following: 
Harold C. Verhaaren, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this ^ 7 day of March, 1998. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
Eric D. Barton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
0267661.01 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Peterson Note, dated June 21, 1991 
B. Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, dated June 21, 1991 
C. December 8 Agreement. 
D. February 18 Letter Agreement 
Tab A 
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T R U S T D E E D N O T E 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note# with Trust Deed securing same, mist 
be surrendered to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$95,000.00 BAIT LAKE CITY, 
_J\me 21, 1991 
FDR VAIUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
MARILVK HAMimaN PETERSON 
NINETY FIVE TH3U3AHD DOLLARS AND 00 CENTS DOLLARS ( $95,000.00 ) 
together with interest f ran date at the rate of N/A 
_ ^ _ per cent ( N/A %) per annum on the unpaid principal, said 
principal and interest payable as follows: 
BAIANCE DUE 9 MDNTKB FROM DATE OF EXECUTION 
A late payment penalty of percent ( %) of any payment due 
shall be assessed against the Maker if said payment has not been received by Holder 
within days of the due date. Each payment shall be credited first to late 
payments due, then to accrued Interest due and the remainder to principal. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or 
any part thereof, or in the perfcmanoe of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed 
securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, 
may declare the entire principal balance and aocrued interest due and payable. 
Maker hereby acknowledges and agrees that the interest rate shall be accelerated 
to percent ( %) per annum on the unpaid balance at the time of 
default. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal 
or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally agree 
to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The nakers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof severally waive presentiment 
for payment, demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent 
to any and all extensions of time, renewals, waivers or mcdifications that may ^) ^ O 
be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the navment or othar nrovieions of ^ 
ui4x» note, anp to uia release or any security, or any part tftereof, with or without 
substitution. 
Ihis note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
ROBERT L. HARRUDTON 
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K A T I E L . D I X O N 
RECORDER, SALT LAKE COWTTt UTAH 
ASSOCIATED TITLE 
R£C BYi KAttM BLANCHMW) i OEPCTY 
**ACi AlOVt TMlt LINC fOt ttCOtOCft't U1C. 
/njzLHdZ. (tpaca Above Thla l\rm for Recording Oetel 
DEED OF TRUST 
WITH XfiSXGHKSKT OP RENTS 
TKU OCCO Of TRUST, mm* ttila 2 1 d»y of June 1 9 9 1 r«tween . 
a« T t U \ f O t , taVeo addreee la . 
ASSOCIATED TITLE OCKPANY 
MnRILW IfAMIUXy PETERSON 
, o Utah corporation, oa TRUSTEE, and . 
_, aa KttflCIARv, 
VlUCSSCSt That Trustor COMVtYt AMD UAltANTS TO TRUSTEE U TRUST, VtTM fOWCt Of SALE, the following described 
property, attuatad lr. fff\LT IAFR County, Stata of Utah: 
IiTT 17 , SUKSET OAKS SUBDIVISION PIAT "BH, AO00RDIM3 TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF ON FILE AND OF REOCCD IN THE SALT LAKE OOUNIY RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
Tooather with all buUdlne*, flsturea and <<yw«ant a tharaon and all water rights, rights of way, easeaants, rants, 
issues, prrfna, tncaaa, tam—nta, heredltMamts, privileges and appurtanancaa thereunto belonging, now or haraafter 
used or onjoyed with Mid prooerty, or any pert thereof, 3JIJCCT, flQUEVER, to tha right, power and authority 
hereinafter given to and conferred upon leneficUry to collet t and apply such rents. Issues, and prof It J. 
(TeiLOU.TO lev.5/87) 
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for the Purpose of securing: 
(1 ) P*imf* ef the fndeotednees evidenced by * proaleeory note of even data hereof In the principal eua af 
S $ 9 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , aad* by Truster, payable to the order of tenaf lc lory at tho t i e * * . In the v a m i r 
and with Interest a* therein ta t f o r t h , and any oxtanoiona and/or renewals or Modification* thereof; 
( 2 ) the perforeence of each a i r •—ant of Trustor heroin contafnad; (3 ) tha psyasnt of ouch additional loam or 
advances ao h«raaftar aay be aede to Truster, or M a sueceeeora or aeelgns, whan evidenced by a promissory nota or 
nota* rec i t ing that thay mr% secured by th la ieed of Trust; and <4> tha payee/* of a l l sues expended or edvenced 
by l e m ' i c l a r y under or pureuent ta tho :ar«a h«r-«of, together with Intaraat tharaon at herein provided. 
To Protect Tha Security of Thla Oeed of Trust, T u t te r Agrees: 
1 . To kaap said proparty In food condition and repair ; not to reaove or deaolish any building tharaon; to 
coapleta or reetore promptly and In food ard workmanlike aurrtar any b u t l d l r i which M y ba constructed, daaeged or 
destroyed tharacn; to cnaply with a l l lace, covenants a d rest r ic t ions af fect ing aald property; not to coanit or 
pa ra i t waste tharaof; not to cecal t , euffer rtr permit any act uron aald proparty In v io la t ion of law; to do a l l othar 
acta Mhlch f rea tha character or use of aald pruptr t r aey ba reasonably necMAary, tha apaclflc enuaeretlons Kara In 
not excluding tha general; and. I f tha loan secured haroby or any part haraof fa being obtainad for the purpose af 
financing construction of laprovaaunta on aald proparty Trustor furthar egreeet 
( a ) To cnaaanco conetruction proaptly and to pursue seee t i l th reasonable dil igence to coaplttlon In accordanca 
with plena and apaclf I cat ! ana sat isfactory to benef iciary, and 
<b) To a l i o * ianaf lc lary to tncpact aald proparty at o i l t laes during construction. 
Truttaa, upon praaantatlon to I t of a t a f f idav i t t l fnad by t a n a f U l e r y , sett ing f o r t * facts shoving s ds'wult 
by Trustor under this rvncaered paragraph, la author! tad to ace apt as trua and concluaiva a l l facts 9ird ststeeents 
therein, and to act tharaon hereunder. 
2 . To prcvida and aeintein insurance, of such typa or typas and Mounts as tancf Ic lary as * require, on tha 
tsproveaente now existing or haraaftar aractad or placad on said proparty. Such Insuranca shall ba carried In 
cenpeniee approved by iana f lc la ry , who aey M k e proof of loaa, and aach inauranca coapany concerned Is h«raby 
author I rod and diractad t> aake peyaent for such loco d t rac t ly to i ana f lc la ry , instaad of te Trustor and Hemfleiary 
Joint ly , and tha Inauranca proceeda. or any part tharaof, aay ba appllad by iana f lc la ry , at I t s option, to tha 
reduction of tha Indebtedieec haraby aacurad or to raatorat lon or rapair of tha proparty damaged. In tha »vent 
that tha Trustor shall f a i l ta provids aat ls factory fcatsrd Inauranca, tha ienef ic lery aay procure, on tha Trustor's 
bahalf, Inauranca In favor af tha ianaf lc la ry elene. I f Inauranca cenrm ba aacurad by tha Trustor to provide tha 
required coverage, th is w i l l conatltuta an act of default undar tha tanas of Peed of Trust. 
S. To dattvar t o , pay for and m Int a In with i ana f lc la ry u n t i l tna Indebtedness aacurad haraby 1s peid in f u l l , 
such evidence of t l t l a m ianaf lc lary aay require, including abstracts of t i t l a or pol ic ies of t i t l e ireurince and 
any txteneione er ronewala tharaof or eupplaeeots that Jto. 
4 . To appaar In and defand any action or proceeding purporting to af fect tha security haraof, tha t i t l e t i said 
property, or the r ights or powers of i ana f lc la ry or Trvatee; and should iana f lc la ry or Trustee elect to appaar in or 
defend any such action or proceeding, to pay a l l costs and expjnees, Including cost of evidence of t i t l a and 
attorney's fees In a reasonable sua Incurred by iana f lc la ry or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency a l l taxae and Mneeaovnts off acting sold property. Including 
a l l Msessajents upon water coapsny stock and a l l rants , eeeeesaents and charges for water, oppurtensnt to or used '.n 
connection with ra id property; to pay, when due, a l l encumbrances, charges, oral llano with Interest , on ssld property 
or any part thereof, whlcN at any l i e * eppecr to ba pr ior or superior hereto; to pay a l l costs, fees, and expense* 
of this Trust. 
a. To pay to Ianaf lc lary aunchty I r advance, m\ aaount, as eat I rated by ienaf lc ia ry in I ts discretion, 
•ufi tciwYt to pay » U tsxet e«d • • • • • • r e n t e af fect ing aald property, and a l l preoluas on Insurance therefor, at ard 
when t*e M M shall becoma due. 
7. Should Trustor f a l l ta sake any reieant er te do any act as herein provided, then leneficiary cr. Trustee 
but without obl igat ion so ta do and without notice to or dewwnd upon Trustor and without releestr-) Trustor froa ery 
obligation hereof, swtyi Make ar do the aaaa In ouch awrnar and to such extant as either aay deaa necessary to 
protect the security hereof, ianaf lc lary or Trustee being authorised to enter upon aald property for such pur>o*eft; 
c o M a n u , appeur In and defend any action or proceed I re. purporting to af fect tha security hereof or the r ir ;* t t e* 
powers af ianaf lc lary or Trustee; pay, purrjteee, cent eat , or coaproalaa any e/wuebrence, charge or l ien unlch in the 
Jud^nant af ei ther eppee-e to ba ar 1 t * or mjp9r\t hereto; mrd In exercising any such powers, incur any I t a L l i i t y , 
aipand whatever aaourKS if. I t s abeeiwte d laerat ion I t aay deea necMssry therefor. Including cost of evidence of ££) 
t i t l e , eaploy counael, end pay bis reeeonabU fees. ^ 
I . To pay I n s o d U u l f and %\XtiM\ daaarsj g l l sum s upended htftvndcr by l e m f l c l t r y or T r u s i n , with inures I ^ 
frca data of expenditure at the rata of X per annua u n t i l paid, and tha repayaent thereof shall t» secured ^ i 
hereby. "O 
<n 
ro 
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t. To pay to tenef Ulery a "late charge- of not to exceed fire cent* (5) for each One Dollar (St.00) of **ch 
peyaent eua hereunder or oVt pursuant to the aforoeald prosriesory note of even data hereof which fa aore than 
fifteen <15> deye In err JSIV . This p a y n t ahall be eade to cover the extra expenee Involved In hendltnf delinquent 
peyasnts. 
IT II MJTUVU.IT AOCE0 TMTI 
10. Could e«ld property or any part thereof be taken or da—aed by reaeon of any public layroe—nt or 
condeanetion proceeding, or do—god by fire, or earthquake, or In any other earner, teneficlary ahall be entitled to 
ail coapenaatlon, awards, and other peyasnts or relief therefor, and ahall be entitled at fta option to coaasence, 
eppeer in and proaecute in Ita own none, any action or proceedings, or to •ate any coaproaisc or settlement. In 
comectlcn with ouch taking or daaeai. All auch cowpervation, awarda, dosages, rights of action and proceoda, 
including the proceoda of any policies of fire and other Insurance effecting eaid property, ere hereby assigned to 
teneflciary, who oey, after deducting therefroa all ita expenses. Including attorney's feet, apply the seae on any 
indebtedness secured hereby. True tor afreee to execute auch further aaaionoenta of any coapenaatlon, award, daaoces, 
and rights of action and procetda aa tenef iclary or Trustee aey require. 
11. At any tie* and fro* tie* to tiae upon written requMt of tenef (clary, peyaent of its feee and presentation 
of thia Deed of Trust and the note for endorsement <in case of full ^conveyance, for cancellation and retention} 
without affecting the 11 ability of any peraon for the peyaant of the Indebtedness accurod hereby, and without 
releeeing the interest of any party Joining in this Deed of TriaC, Tnxtee ray (a) conaent to the asking of any cap 
or plat of said property; (b) Join in fronting any eeseaent or creating any restrict I on thereon; (c) Join in any 
eubordlnation or other ograaaant affecting thia Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof; «D grcit any externion 
or aodif(cation of the teres of thia loan; (e) r«convey, without warranty, all or any part of Mid property. The 
grantee In any reconveyance any be dot ylbod ae "the peraon or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein 
of eny aatters or facta ahall bo conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Truster agrees to pay reasonable 
trustee's feee for any of the services aantiomd In this paragraph. 
12. Aa additional aecurity. Trustor hereby assigns to lenafIclary, during the continuance of these trusts, 
all r^nts, Issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by \Me Oeed of Trust and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor ahall default in the peyaant of any Indebtedness accurod hereby or In the perforaance 
of any agreeaant hereunder, Truster ahall have the right to collect all „uch rents. Issues, royalties, and profits 
Mi-ned prior to default M they beooae due and payable. If Trustor ahall default ae aforesaid, Trustor's right to 
collect any of auch aoneyn shall ce%sc and l«wf iclary ahall have the right, with or without taking possession of 
the property affected hereby, to collect all rente, revolt lee. Issues, and profits, failure or discontinuance of 
tent (Id try of the right, power, and authority Co collect the aaae. lothirg contained herein, nor the exerciee of 
th< right by teneflciary to collect, ahall be, or be construed to be, an aff treat ion by teneflciary of any tenancy, 
lease or option, nor an eoeuaptlan of liability undar, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of 
Trust to any auch tenancy, loose or option. 
13. upon any default by Trustor hereunder, tenefIclary cay at any tiro without notice, either In person, by 
egent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointaent of teneflciary as 
such receiver), •* j without regard to the adrquacy of any aecurity for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon 
and take possession of Mid property or eny part theroof. In its OOT naat sue for or otherwise collect said rents, 
issues, and profits, including those peat dje and unpaid, trti apply the ease, lest costs and expenses of operation 
and collection. Including reasonable attorneya fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in auch order as 
t«nef iclery awy rtetrnslne. 
U . The ami/1 rig upon and taking possession of Mid property, the collection of auch rents, issues, 
and profits, or the proceoda of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
dnaege of sold property, and the application or releose thereof a* aforesaid, ahall not cure or waive any default or 
notice of default hereunder or Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
15. The fatlire on the pert of bansflelery to pr**c*ly enforce ony right hersurrier shall not operate as a we<v«r 
af auch right ervf the waiver by Denaflclary of any defaut* shell not constitute a waiver of ony other or subsequent 
devault. 
la. Ti«s» 1a of tho •aaonoa hereof. Upon default by Trvator In the peyaent of any fndebtsdntte secured hereby 
or In th« perferaance of ony agrm—nt hersunrter, ail suae secured hereby ahall laawjla'.ely becoae due and payeele et 
the optic* of teneflciary. In the event of auch default, teneflciary aay execute or cause Trustee to execute a 
written notice of default and of election to cause Mid property to be Mid to satisfy the obi l oat ions hereof, and 
Trustee shall file such notice for record In aach county wherein Mid property or ease pert or parcel thereof is 
situated, teneflciary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all docuamts evidencing expenditures secured 
h«rsb>. 
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17. After the l*p»e «f sue*
 t f M M My than b« requirwd by law fallowing th« recordation of Mid notica of 
dafault, and notica af aafeuU and notica of aala Having baan ajlvan a* than rehired by law, Truatae, without oamand 
on Tnjatar, shall se l l M U property an tKa data and at tha ttea and placa desianetad In aald notica af tale, atther 
aa a whale or (A aaparata parcels, and In such ardor aa It aay datarailn* (but aubjact to any salutary right af 
Trustor to dlract tha artier In which auch property, If conalattno af taveral known lota er parcela, ahall be aald), 
at public auction to tha Maheat blduar, tha purchaaa prlea payable In lawful aoncy af tha United ftatee at tha tta* 
of sals . Tha paraon conducting tha aala aay. for any cauaa ho daae* axpadlant. poatpone tha sale frost tiaa to tie* 
until It ahetl be coaplated and. In every audi caae( notica of poatponeaan? ahall be flv*n by public declaration 
thereof by euch prion at tha tlaa and placa teat appointed for tha aala; provided. If tha aala U postponed for 
tenser than «r* day bayrd tha day daalanatad In tha notica of aala, notica tHareof ahall be given In tha tamt 
aamer aa tha or Ifinal notice af 4als . Truatae ahall e*«cute and deliver to tha purchaaar Itt dead conveying aald 
property ao sold, but without any convanant of warranty, axprssa or taplied. Tha recltala In tha Oaed of any aattera 
or facta ahall be conclualva proof •i tha trvthfulneaa thareof. Any paraon, Including ienefIciary# My bid at the 
aala. Truatae ahall apply tha proceeds 91 tha aala to oaywent of (1) the cocta mrd exr/snaae of ex<trcleing tha power 
af aala aid ot the aala. Including tha peyaant af tha Truates'e and attorney'• feaa; <2) coat of any avidenca of 
t i t l e procured In connect ten with auch aala and ravanua ateap* on Truataa'a 0«ad; (3) all SUM sxpended under the 
term hereof, not than rape J d, with •ecnmd Intareat at % p*r annua froa data of 9Kp*ndit\jC9; <*) alt ct.Her 
•u*» than aeturad hereby; and <S> tfca rsavelndar. If any, ta tha paraon or peraona laaelly antltlad tharato, or tha 
True tee. In t t t dtacratlon, a»y dapoalt tha balance of auch proceed* with tha County Clark of tha county In which 
tha aala took placa. 
UL Trustor agree* ta surrender poaaeeelan af tha hereinabove daacrlbad Truat property to tha furchaaer at tha 
aforeaafd aala, lanadlataly after auch aala. In tha avent auch poasasalon haa net prevloualy bean surrendered by 
Trustor. 
19. Upon the occurence of any default Hereunder, fwnefIciary ahall Have tha option to d«lara all auna aecured 
hereby leeaedfotaly due and payable mrd foracloaa thla Davd af Truat In tha aaoner provided by law for tha foracloaure 
of aortoaoaa on real property arv* lenvfIciary ahall be antltlad to racever 1n auch proceodings all coite and axpormet 
Incident tharato, Including a reeeonable euorney'a fee In auch eoant aa ahall be fixed by the court. 
20. AanafUicry aay appoint a aucceeaor truatea at any tiaa by f l l l n j for record in the offic* of U»e Covntf 
(•carder af each county In which jw»d property er soa* part thereof la altuatad, a aubatltution of t rut tee. fro* 
tha tiaa tha aubatltution la Iliad for record, the new truatea ahall auccaad to al l tha power*, Ojtitt, authority and 
t i t l e of tha truatee fmmd herein er af any aucceeaor truatea, (ach auch ccbetitution ahall be aracuted mni 
acknowledged, and notica thereof ahall be given end p^eof thereof aade, in tha canner provided by law. 
21. ihla weed of Truat ahall apply ta. Wore ta tha benefit of, and bind all partiea hereto, their heira, 
leoeteee, devleaee, arsolniatreiora, executor*, eucceteors and aaatnna. All obi I cat lone of Truator hereunder are 
Joint and taveral. Tha terai •tanefIciary- *h*ll •ean tha owner end holder. Including eny pledge*, of the note 
aecured heraby. In thla bead of Truat. wfvenever the context ao require*, tho aaacullne sender includes the foal nine 
and/or neuter, and tha tInsular nuxtjer Includra the plural. 
22. Trvatee accepts tf.ia Truat when thla Oeed of Truat, duly executed and actrwwledoad, U s*d* a public 
record aa provided by law. Truatae la rot ctHloated to notify any party hereto of pending aaU u-v*cr any other 
Oeed of Truat or of any action er proceeding In which Truator, geneficiary, or Truatea shall be a party, unlest 
brought by Trustee. 
23. TMf, freed af Truat t ta l l be eonetruwd according to tha '.ewa of the S:*ta of Utah. 
24. The underalanad Truator raqueata that a copy of any notlra of dafeult ani of any notica of tale hereunder 
be aalted to eta at the eddreta herainbefora aet forth. 
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TATf Of UTAH > 
C
* * n Of SALT LAKE > 
On this 2 7 dwy of JUNE 19y91
 t perscrady appeared before sw, 
-ftnnPPT rr Uhonjurrm-l the si«n«r(s> of th« foregoing Iranjeent, who 
**Ky acknowledged to M that HE executed tho s« 
**T Cowaluton Expiree Notary Publ VL^^A4^ . ^ T O ^ * -
«
TM£ Of L*TA* > 
>ss. 
tX\*TT Of ) j 
M»t)4)r>f fw _ ^ ^> —^ ~* -* *** '** • 
1 idfe /«^L.tCE^, 
0 0
 tho day of , A.0. 19 personally appeared before aw
 t 
**1 . *ho being by m duty sworn did My, 
••ch for hleaelf, thet he, the said U tho President, and he, 
t^e «a(d ______________________________________--_-____________•____ *• **»• . Secretary 
•* - -^ that tho within and foregoing tnsrupont was stoned 
•«\ behalf of M i d eorpocstlo"* by wjthority of Its toorc! of 01 rectors, orrf sold 
__ and 
•Vh duly ftcfcnowledojad to aw that said corporation executed the %am and that the seel affixed 
***• Mai of Mid corporation. 
Notary Public 
*V Couftlsston Expiree Residing att 
Do Not Accord 
tfOJC.f rOB fULL ttCOWETAHC€ 
(To be used only when 1ndebte<*-t»«s secured hereby has been paid in full) 
10 
The unriersiftrted is the l***l owner and holder af the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within 
weed of Trust. ^\4 ro\*, together with al l other indebtedness secured by Mid Deed of Trust has beer, fully paid 
and satisfied; ar^
 yoQ _,-, fcersoy requested end directed, on pey-ent to you of any SUMS owing to you under the tere* 
of Mid Deed of tsust, to cancel Mid note enove Mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by Mid 
Deed of Iruat deliv*--^
 t t ^ Ktrewith, together with the Mid Oeed of Trust, and to recenvjy. without warranty, to 
the parties cfc«<tnat«d by the teoea of Mid ©eed of trust all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Mall reconveyance to 
en 
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AGREEMENT 
This Agreement made t h i s fi day of December/ 19992, among 
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON ("Peterson")/ ROBERT L. HARRINGTON 
("Harrington*) and HARRINGTON PROPERTIES/ INC. 
R E C I T A L S » 
A. Harrington executed a Trust Deed Note dated June 21/ 
1991/ made payable to Peterson in the principal amount of Ninety-
Five Thousand Dollars ($95/000) secured by a Deed of Trust dated 
June 21/ 1991, Said Trust Deed was recorded June 27
 # 1991# as 
Entry No, 5088815 in Book 6330 at Page 2939 of the official records 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder (the "Trust Deed") and affects the 
following described real property located in Salt Lake County/ 
State of Utahi 
Lot 17/ SUNSET OAKS SUBDIVISION/ Plat "BH according 
to the official plat thereof on file in the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's office. (the "Property") 
B. Harrington Properties, Inc. is currently the owner of the 
Property ("Owner"). 
C. Harrington has caused and is causing improvements to be 
constructed on the Property (the "Work") and has been acting as the 
general contractor in connection with that construction. 
D. Additional funds are needed to complete the construction 
of the improvements on the Property. 
E. Peterson is willing to advance additional funds to be 
used for that purpose and Harrington and the Owner are willing that 
said advances be secured by the Trust Deed. 
NOW/ THEREFORE/ for good and valuable consideration, the 
receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged/ the parties 
agree as followst 
1* Advance of Additional Funds bv Petereoni Peterson agrees 
to advance funds in an amount not to exceed the total sum of 
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75/000) for the sole purpose of 
paying necessary costs and expenses incurred by Harrington to 
construct and make improvements to the Property. 
12. 
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Harrington and the Owner acknowledge that before Peterson 
shall be obligated to pay any sum or sums under this Agreement, she 
shall be entitled to receive written verification satisfactory to 
her of the amount(s) to be paid for the Work and, at her option, 
may require the delivery of lien waivers and/or releases 
satisfactory to her* Peterson's payments under this Agreement may 
be made to or for the benefit of vendors, material men, laborers, 
subcontractors and contractors who have participated in performing 
the Work and shall be made within three (3) business days following 
her receipt of said written verification, lien waivers and/or 
releases. 
2 . Warranties of Harrington and the Owner* Harrington and 
the Owner represent and warrant that all funds advanced by Peterson 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall only be used to pay 
for the Work and for no other purpose, 
3. Obligation of Harrington and Owner; In addition to the 
payment of the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000) owed 
to her on the original Trust Deed Note dated June 21, 1991, 
Peterson shall be entitled to the payment of all sums advanced by 
her pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, together with 
attorneys fees incurred by her relating in any way to the 
negotiations for and preparation of this Agreement, plus accruing 
interest. Interest on the unpaid balance of each sum advanced by 
Peterson pursuant to Paragraph 1 above shall be calculated from the 
date each sum has been advanced by her until she has been repaid in 
full at the prime rate then charged by Valley Bank & Trust Company 
plus four (4) percentage points. 
4. Payment Due Date: Payment of the sum owed by Harrington 
under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note ($95,000) and 
payment of the sums advanced by Peterson under the terms of this 
Agreement (not to exceed an additional $75,000) shall be due on the 
date the Property is sold by the Owner or is otherwise transferred, 
conveyed or assigned. 
The parties agree that Petersonfs sole recourse to recover the 
sums of money advanced by her under the terms of this Agreement, 
plus interest and attorney fees, and to recover the sum of Ninety-
Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000) owed to her under the terms of the 
original Trust Deed Note, shall be against the Property and/or the 
proceeds arising from its sale or transfer. 
•0r,pet-h«r.igr 2 
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5* Defaults Harrington and the Owner will be in default 
under the terms of this Agreement if they fail to cause Peterson to 
be paid at the time of the sale or transfer of the Property; any 
representation or statement made or furnished to Peterson by 
Harrington or the Owner pursuant to the terms hereof is false and 
misleading in any material respect; or the Owner and/or Harrington 
transfer or assign the Property without the prior written consent 
of Peterson* 
6. Attorney Fees. If Harrington or the Owner defaults under 
the terms of this Agreement, Peterson shall be entitled to recover 
all costs incurred by her in enforcing the terms hereof, including 
reasonable attorney fees, subject to the limitation that her 
recourse to recover the same shall be against the Property and/or 
the proceeds arising from its sale or transfer. 
7. Governing Lav, This Agreement shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
8. Collateral. This Agreement is secured by a Trust Deed 
dated June 21, 1991, more particularly referred to in Paragraph 1 
above. 
9. Assignment. Harrington may not transfer or assign his 
rights under this Agreement, without the prior written consent of 
Peterson, who may withhold that consent for any reason. 
10. Amendments. This Agreement may not be amended or 
modified except by an instrument in writing signed by each of the 
parties to this Agreement. 
11. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and 
together shall constitute one and the same agreement. 
12. Binding Effect. All of the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
heirs, assigns, successors, and other legal representatives of the 
parties. 
•Qr.ptt-har.tgr 
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February 18, 1993 
Marilyn Peterson 
Hamilton Investment Co. 
60 So* Temple Suite 1200 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
RE: Sums advanced in additon to $75,000.00, (December 8, 1992 
Agreement) . 
Dear Marilynt 
This letter will confirm that any money advanced by you, above and 
beyond the $75,000.00 (December 8 1992 Agreement), for the purpose 
of construction of the home located at 1656 S. sunset Oaks Dr., 
will be returned to you with interest consistent with the rate of 
interest in our Agreement dated December 8, 1992, and will be 
returned to you prior to the distribution of any proceeds to 
Harrington Properties Inc. The sale of the house will be the sole 
source of the return of this money. 
Thank you for your help and cooperation* 
Sincerely, 
Bob Harrington 
U 
